We consider the Arrow-Debreu market with linear utilities in which there is a set G of divisible goods and a set B of buyers. Each buyer starts with an initial endowment of goods. The buyer's utility function is a linearly separable function of the goods that the buyer purchases. We develop a simple and efficient algorithm for determining an approximate market equilibrium. Our algorithm finds an -approximate solution in O n/ B G time, where n = B + G . The running time can be further improved to O n/ m + B log B where m is the number of pairs i j such that buyer i has some utility for purchasing good j.
Introduction
Mathematical modeling of markets has been of central importance in mathematical economics. A fundamental question for any market is whether there is a market equilibrium, that is, a collection of prices such that supply is equal to demand and such that all buyers optimize their purchases. Arrow and Debreu (1954) established the existence of equilibrium for markets under a wide range of market assumptions, and both authors subsequently received Nobel prizes. In its citation of the prize for Debreu, the Nobel Prize committee reiterated the central importance of market models. Their citation honors Debreu "for having incorporated new analytical methods into economic theory and for his rigorous reformulation of the theory of general equilibrium." Although Arrow and Debreu established the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, the question of how to efficiently compute the equilibrium remained open. The Arrow-Debreu method relied on Kakutani's (1941) fixedpoint theorem, which did not in and of itself lead to efficient computation of the equilibrium.
In recent decades, the emergence of the Internet and e-commerce has given rise to new markets that are quite distinct from their older counterparts, and are often managed online with computationally intensive techniques. These new markets have led to an increased need for the development of an algorithmic theory of market models.
Fisher (see Brainard et al. 2005 ) developed a simple and very useful model of markets for which the market equilibrium can be efficiently obtained. Eisenberg and Gale (1959) showed the mathematical equivalence of the Fisher model and a concave maximization problem, which was later shown by Jain (2008) to be solvable in polynomial time using the ellipsoid algorithm. In addition, Devanur et al. (2008) gave a combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for finding the market equilibrium. More recently, Orlin (2010) developed the first strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding the market equilibrium. It runs in O n 4 log n time. In Fisher's model, each buyer starts with an initial endowment of money. Arrow and Debreu (1954) consider a more general model in which each buyer starts with an initial endowment of goods. Jain (2008) gave an O n 8 L time algorithm for computing the Arrow-Debreu's market equilibrium using the ellipsoid algorithm, where L denotes the number of bits needed to express the input. Ye (2008) developed an O n 4 L time algorithm for computing market equilibrium using interior point algorithms. It still remains an open problem on how to compute the Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium exactly using combinatorial techniques. However, the Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium can be approximated using combinatorial methods.
Combinatorial methods are of independent interest because they have the potential for faster computation while avoiding numerical issues of interior point algorithms. Jain et al. (2003) gave the first fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the Arrow-Debreu model with linear utilities. They gave a combinatorial method to compute an -approximate solution that runs in O 1/ calls of an algorithm for computing the market equilibrium for Fisher's model. The best time bound for this is the 
O n
4 log n algorithm in Orlin (2010) . Garg and Kapoor (2006) gave a O n 3 / log n/ time algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium for the Arrow-Debreu market. Their definition differs from the one considered here. We describe the difference in §2. Here we develop a simple approximation algorithm that runs in O n 3 / time.
Equilibrium Conditions for the Arrow-Debreu Model
Consider a market consisting of a set G of divisible goods and a set B of buyers. Each buyer has resources to buy goods and the amount of each good is specified. The utility of buyer i purchasing all of good j is U ij , and the model assumes that utilities are linear. That is, if buyer i purchases a fraction f ij of good j, she obtains utility f ij U ij . In the Arrow-Debreu model (Arrow and Debreu 1954) , buyer i starts with an initial endowment e i1 e i2 e i G of goods, where e ij is the initial proportion of good j possessed by buyer i. If p is a vector of prices for the goods, then the value of the goods for buyer i is e i p = j∈G e ij p j . This value is also the purchasing power of buyer i.
An allocation is a vector x = x ij , where x ij is the amount of good j purchased by buyer i as measured in dollars rather than proportions of the good. A solution is any pair p x of prices and allocations. The market equilibrium conditions for the Arrow-Debreu model are as follows:
(i) Each good is purchased; that is, for all j ∈ G, i∈B x ij = p j .
(ii) Each buyer spends all her initial endowment; that is, for all i ∈ B, j∈G x ij = e i p .
(iii) Each buyer purchases only those goods that have maximum utility per dollar; that is, if x ij > 0, then U ij /p j U ik /p k for all k ∈ G In the Fisher model, all initial endowments are in dollars: each buyer i has a fixed amount of money e i , and it does not change by increasing or decreasing the prices. Conditions (i) and (iii) of the market equilibrium conditions for the Fisher case are the same as for the Arrow-Debreu model. Condition (ii) is replaced by the following: for all i ∈ B, j∈G x ij = e i .
Approximately Optimal Solutions
The notation of this paper is taken primarily from Orlin (2010) . Suppose that p is a vector of prices and x is an allocation of goods to buyers. The surplus cash of buyer i is c i p x = e i p − j∈G x ij . The backorder amount of good j is b j p x = −p j + i∈B x ij . (In Orlin 2010, backorder was always nonnegative. In this paper, b j p x 0 at each iteration.)
For a given price vector p, the ratio U ij /p j is called the bang-per-buck of i j with respect to p. For all i ∈ B, we let i p = max U ij /p j j ∈ G , and refer to this ratio as the maximum bang-per-buck for buyer i. A pair i j is said to be an equality edge with respect to p if U ij /p j = i p . We let E p denote the set of equality edges.
Let p x be a solution. We say that the solution is 1-optimal if the following constraints are satisfied:
(i) Nonnegativity constraints: x ij 0 p j 0 for all i ∈ B and j ∈ G.
(ii) Integrality constraints: x ij is integer for each i ∈ B and j ∈ G.
(iii) Approximate cash constraints: c i p x −1 for each i ∈ B. There is no specified upper bound on c i p x .
(iv) Approximate allocation of goods constraints:
At each iteration of our algorithm, the solution maintained will be 1-optimal. For a given 1-optimal solution, one can bound the distance from optimality in absolute terms as shown in the following lemma. The first equality is easily verified. See, for example, Devanur and Vazirani (2003) . The second equality is shown in Orlin (2010) . Because b j p x 0 for all j ∈ G, it follows that c i p x 0 for some i ∈ B. By the approximate allocations of goods constraints, Suppose that > 0 is a specified approximation ratio. The solution p x is called -approximate if it is 1-optimal and if in addition j∈G b j p x + i∈B c i p x j∈G p j Devanur and Vazirani (2003) give an alternative definition of -approximate that is equivalent to the one given here. The definition of approximation of Garg and Kapoor (2006) differs from 1-feasibility in two aspects. Their model would imply an upper bound of 1 on c i p x , which is more restrictive than our model. Second, they permit the bang-per-buck constraints to be satisfied approximately rather than exactly. That is, if x ij > 0, then for all k ∈ G, U ij /p j 1 − U ik /p k . Our next lemma shows that an -approximate solution can be easily transformed into a solution for which c i x = 0 for all i, and in which the sum of the prices is 1. This transformed solution satisfies the definition of -approximation given in Devanur and Vazirani (2003) . We let · denote the L 1 norm.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose that p x is -approximate. Let x be obtained from x as follows:
(i) For all i ∈ B, if c i p x < 0, then decrease the total allocation of i by c i p x . If c i p x > 0, then increase the allocation x ij by c i p x on some equality edge i j ;
(ii) p j = p j / p ; and (iii) x ij = x ij / p . Then p = 1 and b p x .
Proof. Let x be obtained from x by increases and decreases in allocation. We note that c i p x = 0. Moreover, b j p x < b j p x + 1. By Lemma 2.1 and its proof, b p x p . The lemma follows upon dividing x and p by p .
Overview of the Algorithm
This algorithm is based on the scaling algorithm of Orlin (2010) , although it does not use any scaling. It starts with an initial 1-optimal solution p 0 x 0 , where p 0 j = 1 for each j ∈ G, and x 0 = 0. The solution p 0 x 0 is transformed into an -approximate solution using 2n/ calls of a subroutine PriceAnd Augment, which is a slight modification of a subroutine of the same name in Orlin (2010) . PriceAndAugment first selects a root node r ∈ B with c i p x 0. Prices are increased in a piecewise-linear manner until there is a node j ∈ G with b j p x = −1. At this point, there is an "augmentation" from the root node r to node j. The resulting solution remains 1-optimal.
On average, j∈G p j increases by 1 for every call of PriceAndAugment. After 2n/ calls of this procedure, the solution is -approximate because of Lemma 2.1.
The Approximation Algorithm and Proof of Correctness
In this section, we review the technique in Orlin (2010) , and then we present the approximation algorithm.
The Residual Network, Price Updates, and Augmentations
Suppose that p x is a 1-optimal solution. We define the residual network N p x as follows: the node set is B ∪ G. For each equality edge i j , there is an arc i j ∈ N p x . We refer to these arcs as the forward arcs of N p x . For every i j with x ij > 0, there is an arc j i ∈ N p x . We refer to these arcs as the backward arcs of N p x . (See Ahuja et al. 1993 for more details on residual networks.) The algorithm will select a root node r = arg max c i p x i ∈ B
We let ActiveSet p x r be the set of nodes k ∈ B ∪ G such that there is a directed path in N p x from r to k; if k ∈ ActiveSet p x r , we say that k is active with respect to p x and r. We will replace the price p j of each active good j by q ·p j for some q > 1. This is accomplished by the following formula: f q = Price p x r q , where
UpdatePrice p x r is the vector p of prices obtained by setting p = Price p x r q , where q is the maximum value of q such that p x is 1-optimal. At least one of two conditions will be satisfied by p : (i) there is a new edge i j that holds with equality, at which point node j becomes active; or (ii) there is an active node j with b j p x = −1. In the former case, PriceAndAugment will continue to update prices. In the latter case, it will carry out an "augmentation" from node r to node j.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that ( p, x) is 1-optimal and p is the vector of prices obtained by UpdatePrice p x r . Then p x is 1-optimal.
Suppose that p x is a 1-optimal solution. A path P ⊆ N p x is a path from a node i ∈ B with c i p x > 0 to a node j ∈ G with b j p x = −1 is called an augmenting path. An augmentation along the path P consists of replacing x by a vector x where x ij =      x ij + 1 if i j ∈ P is a forward arc of N p x x ij − 1 if i j ∈ P is a backward arc of N p x x ij otherwise.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that p x is 1-optimal, and P is an augmenting path from node r to a node k ∈ G. If x is obtained by an augmentation along path P , then p x is 1-optimal.
Proof. By the definition of node r and by Lemma 2.1, c r p x 0. Also, b k p x = −1. Thus, by sending one unit of flow from node r into node k, 1-feasibility is maintained.
